INVESTIGATION
REPORT
Operation Heritage—a joint
investigation of
alleged corrupt conduct among officers of the
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service
at Sydney International Airport (Interim Report)
alleged corrupt conduct among officers of the
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service
at Sydney International Airport (Interim Report)
This interim report is made to the
Hon. Jason Clare MP,
Minister for Justice and Minister for Home Affairs, pursuant to section 208 of the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006.
Minister for Justice and Minister for Home Affairs, pursuant to section 208 of the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006.
REPORT 02/2013
Enquiries about this report can be
directed to the
Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity
GPO Box 605, Canberra ACT 2601
or via email to contact@aclei.gov.au
Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity
GPO Box 605, Canberra ACT 2601
or via email to contact@aclei.gov.au
© Commonwealth of Australia 2013
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material presented in this publication is provided under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Australia
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The
details of the relevant license conditions are available on the Creative
Commons website, as is the full legal code for the CC BY 3.0 license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/legalcode).
This
publication should be attributed as:
Investigation Report 02-2013—A joint investigation of alleged corrupt
conduct among officers of the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service
at Sydney International Airport
(Interim Report).
Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, Canberra.
Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, Canberra.
The
terms under which the coat of arms may be used can be found on the
It’s an Honour website, at www.itsanhonour.gov.au/coat-arms/index.cfm.
It’s an Honour website, at www.itsanhonour.gov.au/coat-arms/index.cfm.
LETTER
OF TRANSMITTAL
7 June 2013
The Hon. Jason Clare MP
Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Justice
Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600
Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Justice
Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600
Dear Minister
I provide an interim report into my investigation,
known as Operation Heritage, concerning alleged corrupt conduct among officers
of the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service at Sydney International
Airport. The investigation is being conducted jointly
with Customs and Border Protection, and with the Australian Federal Police
(which designates it as Operation Marca).
The purpose of this interim report is to inform you,
in broad terms, of the key factors that led to the arrest of four Customs and
Border Protection officials between August 2012 and February 2013. I intend also that my interim report
will assist the Customs Reform Board, which you established in December 2012 to
oversee the implementation of integrity reforms in Customs and Border
Protection.
In compiling this interim report, I have decided to
exclude certain sensitive information that could have prejudicial consequences
if it were to be published at this time.
I will provide a final report at the conclusion of my
investigation.
Yours sincerely
Philip Moss
Integrity Commissioner
Integrity Commissioner
INVESTIGATIONS AND REPORTS
BY THE INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER
BY THE INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER
THE
LAW ENFORCEMENT INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER ACT 2006
The Law
Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (the LEIC Act) establishes the
office of Integrity Commissioner, supported by a statutory agency, the
Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI).
THE
ROLE OF THE INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER AND ACLEI
The role of the Integrity Commissioner and ACLEI is
to detect, investigate and prevent corruption in the Australian Crime Commission,
the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, the Australian Federal
Police (AFP) and the former National Crime Authority. Other Australian
Government agencies with law enforcement functions may be prescribed by
regulation as coming within the jurisdiction of the Integrity Commissioner.
CORRUPT
CONDUCT
‘Corrupt conduct’ is where a staff member of a law
enforcement agency:
·
abuses his or her office;
·
perverts the course of justice; or
·
having regard to his or her duties and powers, otherwise
engages in corruption.
The Integrity Commissioner is to give priority to
dealing with serious corruption and systemic corruption.
DEALING
WITH CORRUPTION ISSUES
A corruption investigation, conducted by ACLEI, can
commence in different ways.
·
The Minister may refer to the Integrity Commissioner an
allegation or information that raises a corruption issue.
·
The head of a law enforcement agency within ACLEI’s
jurisdiction must notify the Integrity Commissioner of
any allegation or information that raises a corruption issue which relates to that
agency.
·
Any person or government agency (eg the Commonwealth
Ombudsman) can refer to the Integrity Commissioner an allegation or information
that raises a corruption issue. A referral may be anonymous, or on behalf of another
person. A person in custody can make a
referral by a secure communication channel.
·
The Integrity Commissioner can commence an investigation on
his or her own initiative.
The Integrity Commissioner may decide that ACLEI will
investigate a corruption issue, allow a law enforcement agency to conduct its
own investigation, conduct a joint investigation with a law enforcement agency,
or decide that an investigation is not warranted. The Integrity Commissioner
can manage or oversee an investigation that has been referred to a law
enforcement agency. If the law enforcement agency were not the AFP, the
Integrity Commissioner can refer the issue to the AFP for investigation and may
manage or oversee that investigation.
An allegation concerning an employee of a State or
Territory agency (the home agency), seconded to an Australian Government law
enforcement agency, can be referred to the home agency or to the relevant State
or Territory police service or integrity agency for investigation. A joint
investigation can also be undertaken by ACLEI and that agency.
INVESTIGATION
POWERS
When conducting an investigation, the Integrity
Commissioner can:
·
issue a summons or notice, requiring law enforcement
personnel and other people to provide information and documents;
·
obtain and execute a search warrant; and
·
obtain a warrant to intercept telecommunications or conduct
other electronic surveillance.
HEARINGS
The Integrity Commissioner may conduct a hearing for
the purposes of a corruption investigation. A hearing, or part of a hearing,
may be conducted in public or in private.
The word ‘hearing’ as used in the LEIC Act, has no
significance other than to describe a process whereby the Integrity
Commissioner may gather information and evidence, and exercise certain coercive
powers, for the purposes of an investigation. The purpose of a hearing is not
to decide an issue, but to progress an investigation by assisting the Integrity
Commissioner to discover facts that may lead to further action being taken.
STANDARD
OF PROOF
The Integrity Commissioner makes findings about
whether a person has engaged in corrupt conduct, based on the balance of
probabilities. Those findings may not be the same as those that would be made
by a court deciding on criminal guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Before making a finding, the Integrity Commissioner
requires comfortable satisfaction, based on real evidence, that conduct
occurred which fell within the meaning of the LEIC Act. This approach applies
the reasoning of the High Court of Australia in Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938]
HCA 34 (per Dixon
and Rich JJ) and Neat Holdings P/L v
Karajan Holdings P/L [1992] HCA 66.
GRADES
OF CORRUPTION
The relevant provisions of the LEIC Act are based on
the Integrity Commissioner’s finding on a single question—did a person engage
in corrupt conduct? While all corrupt conduct is wrong and should be
eliminated, some instances are less grave than others in terms of, for example,
motives, pre-meditation and planning, concealment and deceptive conduct,
corrupt collaboration, the effects on public confidence in the law enforcement
agency, the effect on other agency staff, and the steps required to rectify the
problem.
The Integrity Commissioner may reflect on this
question of relative gravity in a report.
REPORTING
The LEIC Act establishes the means by which the
Integrity Commissioner may report to the Minister or to members of the public
about issues related to the performance of his or her functions.
For instance—on his or her own initiative, or on
request by the Minister—the Integrity Commissioner may make reports and
recommendations to the Minister in relation to any matter that concerns the
integrity of staff members of law enforcement agencies.
In addition, if the Integrity Commissioner were
satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so, he or she may publish
information.
The Integrity Commissioner may also exclude
information from a report if he or she were satisfied that it is desirable to
do so. In coming to a decision, the Integrity Commissioner must seek to achieve
an appropriate balance between the public interest that would be served by
including the information in the report, and the prejudicial consequences that
might result from that disclosure.
INVESTIGATION REPORT
A joint investigation of alleged corrupt conduct among
officers of the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service at Sydney International
Airport (Interim Report)
REPORT 02/2013
BACKGROUND
2.
One corruption issue was an allegation that one or more
officers at Sydney
International Airport
were in regular contact with a person who, the Australian Federal Police (AFP)
suspected, was involved in the illegal importation of border controlled
substances—namely, pseudoephedrine or other chemicals used in the manufacture
of the illicit drug MDMA (also known as methamphetamine or ecstasy).
3.
In March 2011, I established Taskforce Natio—a joint operations team comprised of investigators
and analysts from the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity
(ACLEI), Customs and Border Protection and the AFP—to investigate this
allegation and related information concerning the possible facilitation by
other Australian Government officials of illicit movements of border controlled
substances. The Australian Crime
Commission (ACC) provided assistance to the taskforce, including by providing
additional surveillance services. The
New South Wales Police also assisted.
4.
At various times, the Chief Executive Officer was the only
senior manager in Customs and Border Protection who was briefed about key
operational details and developments.
This arrangement maintained operational security and ensured that I was made
aware of any factors that might harm unduly the operations of Customs and
Border Protection.
5.
I acknowledge and commend the propriety and cooperation
of Mr Carmody—and his successor in that role, Mr Michael Pezzullo—who both
allowed the investigation to continue for more than 18 months, despite their
knowledge that corrupt conduct was taking place in an agency under their
control. Without their cooperation, the
opportunity to discover the breadth of the corrupt network and its modes of
operating would have been lost.
OPERATION HERITAGE
6.
The aspect of Taskforce
Natio that is the subject of this interim report is Operation Heritage—an investigation into a possible corrupt
collaboration between Customs and Border Protection officers and others to
import illicit drugs through Sydney International Airport. Pursuant to its role of investigating
Commonwealth crimes, the AFP investigated these issues jointly with ACLEI,
under the name Operation Marca, and
contributed additional resources to the Taskforce.
7.
During the investigation, ACLEI has obtained 12 warrants
under the Surveillance Devices Act 2004. A number of extensions were also granted,
some multiple times. Sixteen warrants
have been obtained under the Telecommunications
(Interception and Access) Act 1979, several of which were renewed multiple
times. The AFP has also obtained various
warrants for Operation Marca, to collect evidence covertly about related
persons of interest, or to search their premises. Under the joint investigation arrangement,
ACLEI and the AFP each have had lawful access to information collected by the
other agency.
8.
As Integrity Commissioner, I can summons a witness to attend
an information-gathering hearing. It is
an offence under the Law Enforcement
Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (the LEIC Act) to fail to comply with
a summons, or fail to answer questions, even if an answer were to involve self‑incrimination. Evidence so obtained cannot be used in a
criminal prosecution—other than for a matter of contempt or perjury relating to
the hearing. The evidence may also be
used for disciplinary purposes, or in a civil action for the recovery of
proceeds of crime. To date, I have
held 16 hearings in relation to Operation Heritage. I have held all these hearings in private, to
make best advantage of covert collection of evidence.
9.
The investigation has also made extensive use of physical
surveillance.
Arrests and other proceedings
10.
Between August 2012 and February 2013, four Customs and
Border Protection officers were arrested.
They face (or, in one instance, have already faced) a range of charges
or sentencing for corruption-related offences—including abuse of office,
offering a bribe to a Commonwealth public official, and receiving a bribe—as
well as conspiracy to import a commercial quantity of border-controlled
precursors. One of the accused pleaded
guilty to the charges he faced and, in April 2013, was sentenced by the
New South Wales District Court to seven years' jail with a four-year non‑parole
period.
11.
An officer of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Forestry (DAFF) has also been arrested and faces charges of abuse of public
office, prohibited disclosure of official information, receiving a corrupting
benefit and influencing a Commonwealth public official. Prior to the arrest, the officer was a member
of the DAFF Border Compliance Division and worked at Sydney International
Airport.
12.
Fifteen other people have been arrested, and face charges or
sentencing for offences including conspiracy to import a commercial quantity of
border controlled precursors, bribery of a Commonwealth official and dealing in
the proceeds of crime. At the relevant
time, one of these people was a baggage handler at Sydney International
Airport. Further arrests remain a possibility.
13.
To date, 54 kilograms of pseudoephedrine has been seized,
and cash and assets to the value of approximately $237,000 have been
confiscated.
14.
Operation Heritage–Marca has not concluded, and ACLEI and
the AFP continue to gather evidence. Accordingly,
the generalised comments in this report should not be taken to refer in every
case to the people arrested so far.
Neither are my comments necessarily limited only to those people.
Further actions
15.
At the completion of my investigation, I will provide a
detailed report to the Minister, in accordance with section 54 of the LEIC
Act. At that time, I will make formal
findings about the conduct of individuals who fall within the Integrity
Commissioner’s jurisdiction, and recommend any actions that may be necessary to
hold individuals to account, or that may further strengthen the integrity
framework.
16.
In the interim, I have disseminated information on a number
of occasions to the Chief Executive Officer of Customs and Border Protection,
Mr Pezzullo. The information
I have provided has enabled Customs and Border Protection to commence
disciplinary action against a number of officers.
17.
ACLEI is also compiling information for the purpose of other
criminal proceedings. I expect, in
due course, to bring forward evidence concerning witnesses whom I consider
provided false statements in hearings conducted under the LEIC Act.
Corruption prevention
18.
During 2012, ACLEI officers provided substantial strategic
and technical assistance to a corruption prevention project initiated by
Customs and Border Protection. The
project—which drew on evidence gained from Operation Heritage–Marca—resulted in
considerable changes to Custom and Border Protection’s integrity policy,
practice and organisational arrangements.
19.
A significant outcome of Operation Heritage–Marca was the
passage through the Parliament, in November last year, of the Law Enforcement Integrity Legislation
Amendment Act 2012 (the LEILA Act).[1] That enactment introduced specific anti‑corruption
measures for Customs and Border Protection—namely, drug and alcohol testing,
the power for the CEO to declare that a dismissal was for reason of serious
misconduct (which modifies appeal rights), and an authority to issue binding
orders relating to conduct and integrity (such as mandatory reporting of
misconduct). The new powers bring Customs and Border Protection into closer
alignment with integrity arrangements already in place in the AFP and the ACC.
20.
The LEILA Act introduced a number of other measures to
strengthen resistance to corruption, namely:
(a)
a framework for integrity testing, which will apply to
Customs and Border Protection, the AFP and the ACC; and
(b)
extending ACLEI’s jurisdiction from July 2013 to
include the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), the
CrimTrac Agency and prescribed aspects of DAFF.
21.
ACLEI and the AFP, with assistance from the ACC, have
prepared a corruption vulnerabilities assessment of Sydney International
Airport. The assessment—which identifies possible
remedial changes to procedures and other arrangements—has already been provided
in-confidence to the Minister for Home Affairs and Justice. It has also been provided to the CEO of
Customs and Border Protection and to the Customs Reform Board,[2] to inform
the broad revision of program delivery and agency culture that presently is
taking place.
22.
ACLEI and its partner agencies are applying the intelligence
gained in this investigation to detect potential corruption in other contexts.
HOW DID THE CORRUPTION HAPPEN?
23.
The corrupt conduct observed in Operation Heritage–Marca
involves long-term collusion between a small number of Customs and Border
Protection officers at Sydney
International Airport. So far as can be ascertained, these officers
commenced unauthorised importations of steroids in 2007, an enterprise which
expanded in the intervening years to include more officers and the importation
of the precursor drug pseudoephedrine.
24.
Looking back, the evidence gathered over more than two years
of investigation reveals a concerning picture.
Some officers used their inside knowledge to defeat surveillance and
interdiction systems. This knowledge included information about law enforcement
techniques and systemic vulnerabilities.
They had privileged access to the secure border environment, and access
to law enforcement databases. By working
together, they exploited weaknesses in the supervision system at Sydney International
Airport to manipulate
rosters and job placements, thereby increasing their capacity to facilitate
larger importations of drugs. They used
their official positions and made use of friendships and other connections that
they had developed at Sydney
International Airport
to gather information, and to cover their tracks.
25.
Between 2007 and 2012, on a number of occasions, the corrupt
network is suspected to have organised and facilitated the importation of
border controlled precursors from Thailand
and Vietnam.
26.
The criminal conspiracy grew out of a confluence of
circumstances, including a weak integrity culture and changes in the risk
environment. These preconditions combined
to permit a number of individuals to move from enabling each other’s friends to
exceed duty-free limits when arriving on overseas flights (in 2007), to an
orchestrated importation of steroids and pseudoephedrine (until arrests
commenced in August 2012).
27.
These circumstances are set out in greater detail in the
following paragraphs.
Inadequate preparation for a change in risk
28.
A factor in the Government’s decision, in 2010, to include
Customs and Border Protection in ACLEI’s jurisdiction, was an awareness that
law enforcement agencies were likely to be under an increased threat of corrupt
compromise and infiltration by organised crime groups. This view was informed, in part, by the
Australian Crime Commission’s biannual intelligence review of organised crime
in Australia.
29.
To take account of these changing patterns in transnational
organised crime—and, importantly, an anticipated increase in volumes of
legitimate movements across the border—the agency had oriented towards an
intelligence-led model of detecting and interdicting illicit goods at the
border. With the benefit of hindsight,
it can now be said that Customs and Border Protection responded less well to
the concomitant corruption risk that accompanies a change in threat picture and
operating strategy, and was under-prepared for that risk.
30.
In 2008, Customs and Border Protection commenced
strengthening its internal investigation capability, with a gradual scaling-up
of resources and functions. Other key
elements—such as an integrity framework development team, a formal professional
reporting (whistle-blowing) program, and a risk identification function—were
then not present or were underutilised.
(Recent reforms have started to address these issues.)
31.
In a complex operating environment, it takes perhaps a
decade of investment to embed an effective anti-corruption system—particularly,
to establish a highly-functioning, nationally-based internal investigation
function, and to put in place the means to influence agency culture.
32.
Accordingly, there was a gap between the perception and the
reality of the effectiveness of the anti-corruption measures that had been put
in place. This situation led to the
agency underestimating its risk in environments that should have been
recognised as high-risk, and having an over-confidence in the anti-corruption
measures it had at that time only recently established.
33.
In the absence of evidence of corruption, it was widely
assumed that there was no corruption.
Accordingly, too little attention was paid to systemic vulnerabilities
that were then extant or emerging. This
widespread lack of awareness—somewhat akin to a denial that systemic and
collusive corruption could occur to defeat the system—was a key factor in how
corrupt conduct occurred.
Vulnerabilities associated with a changed model
34.
In broad terms, Customs and Border Protection has the dual
role of facilitating legitimate international passenger movements and trade (on
the one hand), and a law enforcement function (on the other). In the last decade, significant
increases in the volume of passenger and trade movements have put pressure on
this balance.[3]
35.
Customs and Border Protection—not inappropriately, in my
view—responded to this challenge by increasing its reliance on using
multi-channel intelligence to direct interdictions to high-risk passengers
(‘intelligence-led interdiction’). This
passenger profiling and alert strategy, among other law enforcement strategies,
is said to have contributed to higher rates[4]
of successful interdictions in recent years.
36.
When intelligence-led interdiction systems are established
in law enforcement or regulatory environments, it is common to retain a system
of randomised control, or to provide for officers to interdict based upon their
real-time observations. These back-stops
are intended to assure the integrity of the system and are a second line of
defence.
37.
At Sydney International Airport, staff who would normally
have been involved in ‘real‑time targeting’ were frequently diverted at peak
times to perform passenger facilitation roles, namely assisting travellers to
pass through the immigration, customs and quarantine process in a timely
fashion.
38.
Over the same period, Customs and Border Protection adopted
what is referred to as a ‘whole of airport’ strategy at Sydney International
Airport. Rather than having highly specialised
interdiction teams, as was the case previously, staff are required to perform a
wide range of roles. This approach
allows staff to be allocated to the highest priority duties as required, and is
intended to introduce variety to work tasks.
39.
However, the two new approaches (‘intelligence-led’ and
‘whole of airport’) introduced a number of systemic vulnerabilities that were
not sufficiently recognised or controlled.
They were:
(a)
Broader access—With more staff having access to sensitive
databases, and a broader sharing of information and intelligence, there was a
marked increase in opportunity for corrupt conduct.
(b)
Assets of value—The increased reliance on intelligence-led
interdiction and the concentration of information in databases meant that a
corrupt officer with access to sensitive law enforcement information had an
asset of value to criminals. For
instance, such information may include what flights or which passengers are
scheduled for law enforcement activity, thereby allowing a drug courier to plan
flights and arrival times to avoid detection, or to abandon baggage carrying
drugs if an interdiction were planned after the courier boarded a flight. Insider knowledge about limitations in
detection methods meant that drug couriers could be chosen carefully and
coached in methods to ensure that contraband was more difficult for law
enforcement officials to locate by accident.
(c)
Inadequate deterrence—Under changed arrangements, Sydney International
Airport came to rely less
and less on randomised controls and real-time interventions. The absence of random checking reduced the
perceived risk of a chance detection.
Orchestration
40.
Another means to circumvent interdiction at Sydney International
Airport was insider
assistance to ensure a drug courier would not be intercepted in the
International Arrivals Hall. In similar
fashion, it would be of value to a criminal if assistance were provided to
allow quantities of cash to cross the border (in or out) without
declaration. An officer who could assist
in these ways might command a share of the profits of an illicit importation or
a money laundering operation.
41.
By these means, it appears that border officials were able
to engage in larger and riskier importations from their modest start in 2007.
42.
In this interim report, I will not detail how such an
orchestration might have been arranged.
However, there are a number of factors I will highlight below, since
each played a role in ensuring corrupt orchestrations were not noticed.
Misplaced loyalty and compromise
43.
The network—which is apparently broader than just Customs
and Border Protection officers—shared some common demographics, including
school links, age and community ties.
These same links and sources of obligation extended to friends who were
active members in organised crime groups, including outlaw motorcycle gangs.
44.
Disregard for the law, perhaps driven by an uncritical sense
of loyalty to one another, appears to have underpinned the orchestration. A number of the individuals used illicit
drugs, and the compromise of individuals—which could be the basis for
blackmail, or just the means of assuring loyalty—may also have been a factor in
how the network formed and strengthened.
45.
This shared background and affinity meant that the circle of
corruption could be widened with confidence.
Poor standards
46.
The investigation has obtained information which suggests it
had been common for some Customs and Border Protection officials to flout
regulations, whether by inviting friends or family to go to the front of a
Customs queue, or helping them to exceed duty-free allowances for alcohol or
cigarettes by engaging colleagues to allow them to exit the baggage hall
without inspection.
47.
This currency of favours meant that a collaborator would not
know whether a colleague’s friend was carrying excess tobacco (which was
considered acceptable within the culture) or illicit drugs.
Breakdown in supervision
48.
The staff supervisory arrangements at Sydney International
Airport were not well
matched to the risk of the activities carried out by Customs and Border
Protection. The culture, to which I have
already referred, meant that many managers were not alert to or were
indifferent to systemic vulnerabilities and the indicators of corruption. Evidence also suggests there was a risk that
any supervisor who took action about misconduct would be open to reprisal from
certain staff.
49.
During the course of the investigation, it became clear that
a number of Customs and Border Protection officers had raised concerns about
some of the officers who were involved in the matters under investigation. It also became clear that many of these
concerns were not dealt with—or not dealt with effectively—by the agency, thereby
allowing poor conduct to flourish and embolden the perpetrators.
50.
Under the organisational arrangements then in place, no one
area in Customs and Border Protection had an overview of the concerns being
raised about individuals. This situation meant that there was no opportunity to
see the pattern of unprofessional behaviour that may have indicated that a
staff member’s actions required closer scrutiny.
51.
Overall, this situation led to a lack of confidence amongst
staff that wrongdoing would be noted or punished, so poor standards of conduct
became acceptable, and even became the norm in some of the cases investigated.
CONCLUSION
52.
The work of diligent Customs and Border Protection
officers—who are the majority—has been undermined and tarnished by the misconduct
discussed in this report.
53.
Operation Heritage–Marca illustrates what may happen when
individuals take advantage of systemic vulnerabilities in a high-risk operating
environment that lacks adequate safeguards.
54.
An enduring lesson is that corruption risk will follow
opportunity for illicit profit. Policy
designers, and those responsible for governance of high-risk operating
environments, must expect this situation to be the case, and plan accordingly.
Philip Moss
Integrity Commissioner
Integrity Commissioner
7
June 2013
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[1] These
measures were variously recommended in separate inquiries conducted by the
Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement
Integrity, the reports of which were tabled in July and November 2011.
[2] On 20 December 2012, the Minister
for Home Affairs and Minister for Justice, the Hon. Jason
Clare MP, announced the establishment of the Customs Reform Board. The
Board will provide the Minister with advice and recommendations about further
action needed, in addition to those reforms already being put into place, and
will oversee the implementation of reform in Customs and Border Protection.
[3] Each
week in 2011–12, an average of nearly 560,000 air passengers arrived on more
than 3,375 international flights. Nearly
42% of Australia’s international air travellers passed through Sydney
International Airport, compared to 23% for Melbourne Airport and nearly 16% for
Brisbane Airport (source: Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional
Economics, Statistical Report: Aviation—International
Airline Activity 2011–12, Table 4).
The volume of passengers is predicted to increase by six million (or nearly
20%) from 2012–13 to 2015–16, equating to over 700,000 air passengers per week
by 2015–16 (source: Attorney-General’s
Portfolio Budget Statements 2012–13, page 103).
[4] Drug
detections from air passengers and crew have increased over the past three financial
years, from 458 in 2009–10 to 1298 in 2011–12 (source: Australian Customs and
Border Protection Service Annual Report
2011–12, page 91).
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