Friday, 1 March 2013

Ronald Caines V ASIC/ AAT

Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
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Caines and Australian Securities and Investment Commission [2012] AATA 289 (14 May 2012)

Last Updated: 8 August 2012
[2012] AATA 289
DivisionGENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION
File Number(s)2010/4515
ReRONALD CAINES

APPLICANT
AndAUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENT COMMISSION

RESPONDENT

DECISION

TribunalDean Letcher, QC, Senior Member
Date14 May 2012
PlaceSydney
The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
......................[SGD]...........................
Dean Letcher, QC, Senior Member

CATCHWORDS
CORPORATIONS – application to cancel or vary banning order – financial services provider – change in circumstances on which banning order made – discharge from bankruptcy – proper understanding of disclosure requirements – no dishonesty or intention to defraud – banning order varied upon Tribunal accepting enforceable undertaking – decision set aside
LEGISLATION
Corporations Act 2001(Cth): ss. 920A, 920B, 920D, 947C
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth.) s. 93AA
Bankruptcy Act 1966

CASES
ASIC v Adler [2002] NSWSC 483; [2002] 42 ACSR 80
Rich v ASIC [2004] HCA 42; [2004] 220 CLR 129
Re Julian Hayes v. Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2006] AATA 1506
Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; [1938] 60 CLR 336
Re Australian Securities and Investments Commission v. Ronald Caines [2011] AATA 457



SECONDARY MATERIALS
Australian Securities & Investments Commission Regulatory Guide 175 “Licensing: Financial Product Advisers – Conduct and Disclosure” (May 2009)
Australian Securities & Investments Commission Regulatory Guide 181 “Licensing: Managing Conflicts of Interest” (30 August 2004)
Australian Securities & Investments Commission Regulatory Guide 98 “Licensing: Administrative action against Financial Service Providers” (April 2006)


REASONS FOR DECISION

Dean Letcher, QC, Senior Member



  1. Ronald Caines has applied for the review of a decision of a delegate of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) refusing to vary or cancel a banning order prohibiting him permanently from providing any financial services. The making of the banning order itself is not in question.
BACKGROUND
  1. Mr Caines was an “authorised representative” of successive companies licensed as investment advisers between 2004 and 2008, namely Elm Financial Services (Elm), Wright Global Investments (WGI) and Solutions Wealth Strategies (SWS). In the period 2005 to 2006 Mr Caines provided Statements of Advice for clients advising them to invest in funds promoted by a company associated with Mr Shawn Richard. The total of amounts so invested was some $1,055,000.00.
  2. Mr Caines, his wife and a company, received from Mr Richard and his associated company, in that similar period, amounts totalling at least $557,667.18 and possibly as much as $762,175.72. No disclosure of the receipt of any of those amounts was made by Mr Caines to any of his clients.
  3. On 5 August 2008 a delegate of ASIC made a banning order under sec 920A of the Corporations Act 2001 (the Act) prohibiting Mr Caines permanently from providing any financial services. The delegate found that Mr Caines “... did not understand a fundamental duty [of disclosure] owed by financial services participants to their clients ...”, and his statement in the ASIC proceedings “... demonstrates that he does not yet understand the importance of disclosure obligations under the Act”. The delegate was therefore satisfied that “... ASIC has reason to believe that Mr Caines will not comply with a financial services law”. Banning orders are for the protection of the public but also have aspects of general and specific deterrence with the length of the period being influenced by Santow J’s propositions from ASIC v Adler [2002] NSWSC 483; [2002] 42 ACSR 80 approved by the High Court in Rich v ASIC [2004] HCA 42; [2004] 220 CLR 129 and followed inJulian Hayes v ASIC [2006] AATA 1506 and other cases.
  4. The delegate was also satisfied that Mr Caines’ bankruptcy was relevant to the provision of financial services, that he was a person “... who has become insolvent under administration within the meaning of s920A(1)(bb) of the Act ...” and consequently that Mr Caines was unable to manage his financial affairs. Having had regard to the serious nature of Mr Caines’ conduct and in view of the uncertain period of Mr Caines’ bankruptcy, the delegate was reasonably satisfied that the appropriate order was to prohibit Mr Caines permanently from providing any financial services. However, the delegate noted that upon Mr Caines being discharged from bankruptcy and “... at such time as he believes he has come to understand his duties and legal obligations as a participant in the financial services industry ...”, it was open to him to apply to ASIC under sec 920D to vary or cancel the banning order.
  5. On 1 May 2010 Mr Caines applied to ASIC to lift the banning order on his prospective discharge from bankruptcy on 3 July 2010. On 6 May 2010 the delegate of ASIC responded that while Mr Caines’ bankruptcy was a factor in her decision to impose a banning order, it would also be necessary for Mr Caines to identify a change in the other circumstances relating to his breach of the disclosure requirements. The delegate said in her letter to Mr Caines:
“Unless you can identify such a change in the circumstances, apart from your discharge from bankruptcy, I am of the view that the period of banning should continue for a period of 5 years commencing on 12 August 2008, being the date on which the order was served on you.”
  1. The delegate invited Mr Caines to ask for the matter to be reviewed if he did not agree with the assessment.
  2. Mr Caines was discharged from bankruptcy on 3 July 2010. On 13 August 2010 his solicitors wrote to ASIC requesting a lifting of the banning order. On 7 September 2010 the delegate conducted a hearing in relation to Mr Caines’ application and, on 22 September 2010, decided not to vary or cancel the banning order. The delegate found that the relevant circumstances upon which ASIC based the banning order were:
    • (a) Mr Caines failed to disclose loans to himself, his wife and his company which were monetary benefits that might reasonably be expected have been capable of influencing the advice given to clients, contrary to s 947C(2) of the Act. [s 920A(1)(e)]
    • (b) Mr Caines had become an insolvent under administration, contrary to s 920A(1)(bb) of the Act.
    • (c) ASIC had reason to believe that Mr Caines will not comply with a financial services law. [s 920A(1)(f)]
    • (d) In such circumstances, a period of prohibition was imposed on Mr Caines from providing financial services. By reference to ASIC Regulatory Guide 98, an appropriate period of banning for the disclosure obligations breaches by Mr Caines was considered to be five years. However, having regard to the uncertainty of when Mr Caines’ bankruptcy would end, a permanent banning order was made and in the reasons for decision it was noted that the order could be revoked or varied in the future.
  3. The delegate said at [44] of the Statement of Facts, Findings and Reasons for Decision of 22 September 2010:
“Based on the information presently before me, it would appear that I should make no order at this time. As suggested in the reasons for decision provided with the banning order, the appropriate time for Mr Caines to consider applying for a variation or cancellation of the banning order is after 5 years of the order coming into effect.”
  1. On 19 October 2010 Mr Caines applied to the Tribunal for a review of this decision and the Tribunal on 16 March 2011 made orders varying the order upon the Tribunal accepting an enforceable undertaking as to education and supervision (re Re Australian Securities and Investments Commission v. Ronald Caines [2011] AATA 457). However, those findings and orders were set aside by the Federal Court of Australia and the matter remitted for re-hearing by the Tribunal [the present proceedings]. I am indebted to Deputy President Handley for his careful and thorough account of the facts and law relating to the application and its history set out in his prior decision.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
  1. The power to vary or cancel a banning order is set out in sec 920D of the Act:
920D Variation or cancellation of banning orders
(1) ASIC may vary or cancel a banning order, by giving written notice to the person against whom the order was made, if ASIC is satisfied that it is appropriate to do so because of a change in any of the circumstances based on which ASIC made the order.
(2) ASIC may do so:
(a) on its own initiative; or
(b) if the person against whom the order was made lodges with ASIC an application for ASIC to do so, which is accompanied by the documents, if any, required by regulations made for the purposes of this paragraph.
Note: For fees in respect of lodging applications, see Part 9.10.
(3) If ASIC proposes not to vary or cancel a banning order in accordance with an application lodged by a person under paragraph (2)(b), ASIC must give the person an opportunity:
(a) to appear, or be represented, at a hearing before ASIC that takes place in private; and
(b) to make submissions to ASIC on the matter.
  1. The power to make a banning order is set out in sec 920A and the nature and effect of a banning order are explained in sec 920B and sec 920C respectively.
920A ASIC’s power to make a banning order
(1) ASIC may make a banning order against a person, by giving written notice to the person, if:
(a) ASIC suspends or cancels an Australian financial services licence held by the person; or
(b) the person has not complied with their obligations under section 912A; or
(ba) ASIC has reason to believe that the person will not comply with their obligations under section 912A; or
(bb) the person becomes an insolvent under administration; or
(c) the person is convicted of fraud; or
(e) the person has not complied with a financial services law: or
(f) ASIC has reason to believe that the person will not comply with a financial services law.
(2) However, ASIC may only make a banning order against a person after giving the person an opportunity:
(a) to appear, or be represented, at a hearing before ASIC that takes place in private; and
(b) to make submissions to ASIC on the matter.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply in so far as ASIC’s grounds for making the banning order are or include the following:
(a) that the suspension or cancellation of the relevant licence took place under section 915B;
(b) that the person has been convicted of serious fraud.

(Emphasis added)
920B What is a banning order?
(1) A banning order is a written order that prohibits a person from providing any financial services or specified financial services in specified circumstances or capacities.
(2) The order may prohibit the person against whom it is made from providing a financial service:
(a) permanently; or
(b) for a specified period, unless ASIC has reason to believe that the person is not of good fame or character.
(3) A banning order may include a provision allowing the person against whom it was made, subject to any specified conditions:
(a) to do specified acts; or
(b) to do specified acts in specified circumstances;
that the order would otherwise prohibit them from doing.

920C Effect of banning orders
(1) A person against whom a banning order is made cannot be granted an Australian financial services licence contrary to the banning order.
(2) A person contravenes this subsection if:
(a) the person engages in conduct; and
(b) the conduct breaches a banning order that has been made against the person.
Note: A contravention of this subsection is an offence (see subsection 1311(1)).
  1. The main requirements for a “Statement of Advice” given by an authorised representative to a client are set out in sec 947C. This provides relevantly:
947C Statement of advice given by authorised representative – main requirements
(1) This section applies if the providing entity is an authorised representative.
(2) Subject to subsection (3) and to the regulations (see subsection (4)), the Statement of Advice must include the following statements and information:
(a) a statement setting out the advice; and
(b) information about the basis on which the advice is or was given; and
(c) ...
(d) ...
(e) information about the remuneration (including commission) or other benefits that any of the following is to receive that might reasonably be expected to be or have been capable of influencing the providing entity in providing the advice:
(i) the providing entity;
(ii) an employer of the providing entity;
(iii) the authorising licensee, or any of the authorising licensees;
(iv) an employee or director of the authorising licensee, or of any of the authorising licensees;
(v) an associate of any of the above;
(vi) any other person in relation to whom the regulations require the information to be provided; and
(f) information about:
(i) any other interests, whether pecuniary or not and whether direct or indirect, of the providing entity, any employer of the providing entity, the authorising licensee or any of those authorising licensees, or of any associate of any of those persons; and
(ii) any associations or relationships between the providing entity, any employer of the providing entity, the authorising licensee or any of the authorising licensees, or any associate of any of those persons, and the issuers of any financial products; that might reasonably be expected to be or have been capable of influencing the providing entity in providing the advice; and
(g) ...
(h) ...
(i) ...
(3) Subject to subsection (4), the level of detail about a matter that is required is such as a person would reasonably require for the purpose of deciding whether to act on the advice as a retail client.
(4) ...
(5) ...
(6) The statements and information included in the Statement of Advice must be worded and presented in a clear, concise and effective manner.
  1. ASIC’s complaint is that Mr Caines did not comply with subsections 2(e)(iv) and (v) and 2(f)(i) and (ii) of sec 947C in that he failed to disclose to his clients the financial benefits to himself, his wife and related companies from the sale of his business and receipt of loans from the funds and associates receiving the clients’ investments. The issue in this case is whether the banning order made by the ASIC delegate on 5 August 2008 should be varied or cancelled. The Tribunal, standing in the shoes of the ASIC delegate, may, in accordance with sec 920D of the Act (set out above), vary or cancel the banning order if satisfied that “it is appropriate to do so because of a change in any of the circumstances based on which ASIC made the order”. It should be noted that the role of the Tribunal is not, in this instance, to review the decision to make the banning order itself.
  2. There is no dispute that there has been at least one change in the relevant circumstances based upon which the ASIC order was made, which is that Mr Caines was discharged from bankruptcy on 3 July 2010. The focus of the evidence was, therefore, on whether there were other changes in these circumstances and, in particular, on whether Mr Caines understands the disclosure requirements insec 947C(2) of the Act, and whether he will comply with such provisions in the future.
THE CIRCUMSTANCES UPON WHICH THE BANNING ORDER WAS MADE
  1. While the Tribunal’s role is not to review ASIC’s decision to make the banning order against Mr Caines, it is nevertheless, necessary to rehearse some of the facts that led to the making of that decision. This is to enable the Tribunal to make a finding about Mr Caines’ understanding of the disclosure obligations owed by financial services participants to their clients and whether there has been a change in the relevant circumstances since the time of ASIC’s decision.
  2. The Tribunal’s task is to determine whether there has been “a change in any of the circumstances based on which ASIC made the order” and if so it is thereby appropriate to vary or cancel the banning order.
  3. It is common ground that when the order was made Mr Caines was bankrupt and his bankruptcy has now ended. The existing bankruptcy from 24 May 2007 to 3 July 2010 was one of the grounds upon which the permanent order was made but it was the indefinite period of the order which was determined by the bankruptcy rather than the banning order itself. The other grounds for the order were: firstly, the lack of understanding of Mr Caine’s duties and legal obligations as a participant in the financial services industry; and, secondly, the belief that, given that lack of understanding, Mr Caines was likely to not comply with a financial services law.
  4. On 1 May 2010, before he was discharged from bankruptcy, Mr Caines requested ASIC to lift the order made on 5 August 2008 but ASIC refused. Mr Caines was discharged from bankruptcy on 3 July 2010 (almost two years from the date of effect of the order 12 August 2008). As required ASIC’s delegate then conducted a hearing on 7 September 2010 at which Mr Caines was represented and made submissions and on 22 September 2010 declined to vary or cancel the order.
  5. On 19 October 2010 Mr Caines lodged an application seeking review by this Tribunal of the adverse decision of 22 September 2010. This Tribunal’s jurisdiction is to make the correct or preferable decision in the shoes of the ASIC delegate as to whether the banning order should be varied or cancelled.
  6. The power is in sec 920D of the Act:
(1) ASIC may vary or cancel a banning order, by giving written notice to the person against whom the order was made, if ASIC is satisfied that it is appropriate to do so because of a change in any of the circumstances based on which ASIC made the order
  1. It can be seen that there is a discretion to vary or cancel only if the Tribunal is satisfied that it is appropriate to do so because of a change in any of the circumstances based on which ASIC made the order. The Tribunal has the same powers as ASIC. The threshold question is whether there has been a significant change in the matters relied upon by ASIC to make the original order. If so, then there is a discretion to be exercised whether or not to vary or cancel by reason of the change. If there has not been significant change in those matters relied upon by ASIC then the Tribunal has no discretion to alter the decision.
THE APPLICANT’S CASE
  1. Mr Caines’ contention was that after the first AAT hearing he had studied the ASIC publications and educated himself concerning conflicts and disclosure so that no further educational program was required. He pointed to the lack of dishonesty, no evidence of loss and his long experience. He regarded the basis for the loans as friendship without any business connection.
  2. Mr Caines gave evidence and was tested in cross-examination directed to his understanding of obligations, his credit and his recent past activities
  3. Cross-examination on credibility (credit) is allowed when the evidence to be adduced by that cross-examination may have substantial probative value, that is, it may have a real and persuasive bearing on the reliability of the witness’s evidence or part of it. Questioning related to any motive to be untruthful, to unreliability of recollection, prior inconsistencies in statements – all these are allowed whereas an allegation of general dishonesty may not be permitted because it lacks probative value and is in the context unfair. In this case the nature and extent of Mr Caines’ knowledge and real acceptance of his obligations was critical.
THE RESPONDENT’S CASE
  1. ASIC opposed the application and asserted that no sufficiently significant change of circumstances had occurred to enliven the operation of sec 920D upon which the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is founded. ASIC recognised that the discharge from bankruptcy was a changed circumstance. The submission was that Mr Caines did not show an understanding of his ethical duties and legal obligations as a financial adviser sufficiently or significantly changed from the commencement of the banning order 12 August 2008, the delegate’s decision of 16 May 2010 or the decision under review of 22 September 2010.
  2. ASIC submitted that the evidence showed no sufficient “change in any of the circumstances based upon which ASIC made the order” to justify the exercise of a discretion to vary or cancel the order. Further, ASIC contended that the evidence showed that ASIC had good reason to believe that Mr Caines “will not comply with financial services law”, meaning in particular the identification of conflicts of interest and the disclosure to clients of such matters.
  3. The ASIC delegate’s decision of 22 September 2010 included findings that those relevant circumstances included:
(a) the undisclosed receipt of over $500,000.00 from associates of the same investment fund that he recommended to his clients.
(b) Mr Caines’ statement that he did not know that he ought to have disclosed the receipt of the money received from those associates showed that he did not understand a fundamental duty owed to clients.
(c) Mr Caines demonstrated that he did not understand the importance of the disclosure obligations under the Act.
(d) ASIC had reason to believe that Mr Caines would not comply with a financial services law.
(e) Mr Caines was unable to manage his own financial affairs as a result of which he became insolvent and bankrupt in 2007.
CIRCUMSTANCES RELEVANT TO THE BANNING ORDER
  1. Taking each of ASIC’s relevant circumstances in turn:
  2. As to (a) receipt of amounts not disclosed to clients the non-disclosure and receipt of the amounts are facts that cannot be changed. What can alter is the understanding of obligations, acceptance of importance of the duties and change in Mr Caines’ ability to manage his affairs so as to avoid breaches of financial laws.
  3. As to (b) lack of understanding of his duty to clients Mr Caines asserted that he now had a full understanding and acceptance of the obligations of disclosure and avoidance of conflict by a financial planner and that he would comply fully with the law. ASIC did not accept that this was so and cross-examined him as to credit, understanding and ability to comply in the future. Mr Caines produced a handwritten statement signed by him but clearly composed by a lawyer and more in the nature of assertions than statements of fact (see Exhibit C).
  4. It is not necessary to recite all the events giving rise to the banning order. Suffice to say that in 2004-2005 Mr Caines gave Statements of Advice and advised clients to make investments of over $1 million in the Astarra “Absolute Return” funds when Shawn Richard was a director of the funds management company. Mr Caines received somewhere between $557,667.18 (the admitted amount) and $762,175.72 (the amount in the 2007 Deed of Loan) from Mr Richard or his associated company between 2004 and 2006. The reason for these large payments has never been satisfactorily explained by Mr Caines.
  5. ASIC has not alleged fraud, dishonest conduct or loss suffered by Mr Caines’ clients.
  6. Mr Caines has asserted without challenge that none of the clients lost money from the transactions. However, his evidence concerning the reasons behind the receipt of the money from Mr Richard has been changeable. Initially, he told the ASIC delegate that the entire amount was a personal loan from Mr Richard and it had no business connection. Later, his story has been that he sold his advisory business and the purchase price was a substantial part of the amount. However, when questioned about the sale details, it emerged that the sale was undocumented, he did not know which entity had bought the business, and he “considered” without explicit agreement that the first three payments (totalling $304,830.68) were, or should be, considered as payment for the purchase of the business. He explained the discrepancy between a supposed purchase price of $AUD300,000.00 and the receipt of $AUD304,830.68 by “currency fluctuations between the Australian dollar and the US dollar”. As the Australian dollar was always well below parity with the US dollar at the time this is not a tenable explanation.
  7. As to the loan amounts, he denied that they were in fact commission on the investments, asserted that they were personal loans with no business connection and maintained that the only reason for the loans was friendship. He was prepared to accept that the only reason that Richard advanced him these hundreds of thousands of dollars was “out of the goodness of his heart” (see transcript 63.30).
  8. The context was that Mr Caines was on the brink of bankruptcy with no realistic prospect of making repayment. The only loan document was a “Deed of Loan” created over two years after the first payment in March 2007, a document which Mr Caines’ solicitor characterized as a ‘sham’. There was no worthwhile security for the ‘loans’ and Mr Richard was said by Mr Caines not to believe he would ever be repaid.
  9. Mr Caines asserted that his study of the ASIC publications had now fully informed him of his obligations. There are several points to be made about that assertion. His evidence was that he had read the ASIC material only after the first Tribunal hearing (see transcript 72.33 and 89.25), his first contact with a training organization was also after the first hearing (see transcript 47.50) and he never took up that course. Between 2008 and the first Tribunal hearing in 2011 he had not changed his view that the ‘purchase” amounts did not require disclosure (see transcript 68.25) and at [9] of his written submissions three days before this hearing that the obligation was “not clear cut” reinforced that view. The furthest Mr Caines went before this hearing was is noted at [21] of the parties’ Statement of Agreed Facts:
“He did not see why payments for the sale of his business should have been disclosed, however, he said this was something in respect of which he would now seek appropriate advice”.
  1. In this context the suggestion in cross-examination that a change in his view was “... something that you have come up with today because you have been advised that that’s your best chance of in some way getting the order varied or cancelled ...” was well-justified. The cross-examiner suggested that his views had not really altered but he was prepared to say what he thought ASIC wanted to hear (transcript 67.23). Mr Caines’ evidence about the reasons for the advances of over $500,000.00, for not undertaking a training course, for not gaining employment and for his successive changes of view of his obligations were simply not credible. I found his evidence unconvincing, incomplete and inaccurate on important details. I do not accept Mr Caines as a witness of credibility on the issues of significant change in knowledge of relevant obligations, nor his acceptance of the importance of disclosures of conflicts in the conduct of investment advisory tasks.
  2. As to (c) lack of understanding of importance of the disclosure obligations: Mr Caines’ solicitor’s letter of 13 August 2010; his case at the delegate’s hearing on 22 September 2010; his evidence at the first AAT hearing on 25 February 2011; and, his written submission of 25 November 2011 in relation to this hearing, all did not accept that Mr Caines had a duty to disclose to clients that he had received $304,000.00 following the sale of his business to Mr Richard. I am left with the clear impression that until this most recent hearing Mr Caines believed that his chances of lenient treatment were improved by saying that the bulk of the money received was from a sale of his business because there was no obligation to disclose that sale. That would be why the written submissions lodged three days before the hearing at [9] say:
“The situation in respect of advancing money to Caines by Richard and Century [Investments Limited] is not clear cut as ASIC presumes it is. Caines says that an amount of $304,000 was received as a result of the sale of his business presumably to Wright Global Investments Proprietary Limited”.
  1. The distinction is being made between loans and purchase money but the evidence that there was, in fact, a purchase is very tenuous. The Deed of Loan from 2007 speaks only of loans. Mr Caines’ evidence conceded that there was no written agreement, that he did not know exactly who or what bought the business and at 80.5-20 of the transcript of this hearing he said of payments beginning in 2004: “They were advances and loans until we established the fact that he would buy my business...They were advanced as a loan...”. He asserted that there was a “verbal agreement” but the terms were never stated.
  2. Mr Caines maintained until this hearing that he believed Century Investments was an independent third party and hence there was no obligation to disclose payments from Century Investments to his clients but under cross-examination he conceded that: “...look, to be honest with you, I assumed that Shawn must have had an interest in that company” (see transcript 86.40) although he tended to back away from that under further questioning.
  3. At the time of Mr Caines advising his clients to invest in Astarra Mr Richard was a director and secretary of Astarra to whom the clients’ funds were duly paid. Century made several of the loan payments and its relationship with Mr Richard has never been clarified except that the parties’ Statement of Agreed Facts notes at [11] that it was a British Virgin Islands company with which Mr Richard was associated.
  4. There was a clear breach of obligation by Mr Caines in his failure to disclose to clients, investing in excess of $1,000,000.00, that he was receiving over $300,000.00 for the sale of his advisory business from a director of the investment fund. In addition, Mr Richard was: either purchaser of the Caines business himself, or, director of WGI as purchaser; a director of, or closely related to Century Investments; and, was in the course of lending Mr Caines large amounts unsecured. It was only in cross-examination from ASIC (see transcript 66) that Mr Caines said that he had not fully understood that the sale should have been disclosed but even then he began by describing the transaction as a loan (see transcript 66.15) until cross-examined in detail.
  5. Indeed, Mr Caines was asked:
“I want you to tell me why you [now] say it should be disclosed?”
He replied:
“Why? Because under report 30 in relation to soft dollar benefits and in particular section 8 of that report it states – that even a loan to [a financial services licensee], even on commercial terms from a product provider , could be seen as influencing the [advisor] ...”
The response was given in terms of what the ASIC publication said but not with any real sense of the reason behind the rule.
  1. Mr Caines asserted (see transcript 66.45):
“I absolutely should have disclosed that (sic) sale proceeds. It should have been put in the FSG [financial services guide] and it should have been put in the Statement of Advice to clients to advise them that I was selling my business and that I was going to receive funds from the sale of that business and those funds could be seen to be coming from a product provider.”
  1. However, he went on to state that if he had a future sale “I would disclose it because there is absolutely – from the point of view of disclosure and conflicts of interest, I can understand ASIC’s viewpoint in relation to how there could be seen to be conflicts and potential disclosure issues in relation to recommending funds from that particular product provider ...”. Whilst this is a statement of understanding the ASIC opinion it is not an acceptance that the problem is a real one.
  2. It was Mr Caines case that he had improved his understanding of his obligations by a course of self-study and that a formal course of education was not necessary. It emerged that he had read ASIC’s regulatory guides shortly after the February 2011 hearing on ASIC’s website, downloaded them and read them several times (see transcript 89.20). He became aware of an online course offered by RG146 Organization specifically on conflicts of interest and disclosure which would have taken about two days to complete followed by an examination (see transcript 46.45), but he had not undertaken that course because he had not been able to afford the $260.00 fee. He had been hoping to have the ban lifted and then borrow the money or have an employer pay for it (see transcript 47.10). He agreed that since 2008 he had known that one way to deal with a lack of understanding of disclosure obligations was to undertake a training course but he had not done so.
  3. Unfortunately, this seems to reflect quite accurately Mr Caines’ attitude to the banning order: that it should not really have been applied to him; that his transgression was a mistake but more of a ‘compliance issue’ than a breach; and, that he had suffered enough. I am not satisfied that Mr Caines accepts the importance of the disclosure requirements in general, nor that he has given a truthful account of the reasons why he received the large amounts of money nor that he has done more than pay lip service to the task of learning and accepting the regulatory requirements that he breached.
  4. As to (d) whether ASIC has reason to believe that Mr Caines will not comply with a financial services law: the first Tribunal believed that Mr Caines was confused about his obligations arising from his financial arrangements. Having heard further cross-examination and elaboration of his story, I am not convinced that he was confused rather than unconcerned about his obligations.
  5. I do not draw an adverse inference on this ground from the mere fact of the two bankruptcies, nor on the basis that the Bankruptcy Act 1966 may be a “financial services law”. However Mr Caines’ evidence about the reasons for the bankruptcies showed an unwillingness to take responsibility for them despite the facts showing otherwise. Similarly, his reluctance to give a clear account of his dealings with Mr Richard showed that he was prepared to advance the version which seemed to best suit his advantage at the time. That version changed dramatically as hearings progressed, for example: the loans or purchase and Mr Richard’s association with Century.
  6. Before this hearing he had stated that WGI (Wright Global Investments) had definitely decided not to buy his business, and that Shawn Richard had been the purchaser for $300,000.00.
  7. Thus, in 2008 Mr Caines said: “... WGI didn’t want to show the sale of my business in their books. When I got into difficulty I had discussions with Shawn that I needed funds. I knew the value of my business was $300,000.00 and the first $300,000.00 I received was what I considered to be the sale of my business”.
  8. In cross-examination (see transcript 76.10):
Question: “Is it your evidence that, whilst there was no discussion to that effect, you simply regarded the first $3000.000.00 that you received from Mr. Richard as on account of the business that you were transferring to WGI?”
Answer: “That’s right.”
  1. There was further evidence of conversations, but this account seems to explain why the first three payments totalled $304,830.68 rather than an exact $300,000.00. The proffered explanation that the additional $4,830.68 was caused by “an exchange difference” does not make sense, and the odd amounts of all the other payments are more consistent with someone calculating amounts of commission, rather than a friend making advances purely out of the goodness of his heart (see transcript 58.05, 63.25). I do not make a finding that the payments were a form of commission but I find it concerning that Mr Caines was not troubled by the questions of origin, amount, or, reasons for the payments. He refers to himself, a veteran of thirty years in the investment business, as naive (see transcript 59.33).
  2. My view is that Mr Caines has a deficient understanding of his obligations under security laws such that he is likely to offend again. This may be “inadvertent” by reason of his failure to pay attention to those laws or because he does not fully accept that he needs to be educated in the situations where conflict arises, and where the client is entitled to disclosure before committing funds.
  3. As to (e) ability to manage his financial affairs: the final story which Mr Caines asserted at this hearing was that he “considered” that there was a sale for $300,000.00 of his business, although he did not know who was the actual purchaser and there was no documentation. The idea that a financial adviser would dispose of his valuable business to a person unknown, without a written agreement, at a time uncertain with no agreement about time of payment is difficult to accept. It was a most improbable situation but Mr Caines did not appear to regard it as unusual or inappropriate except in the eyes of ASIC. That story and the history leading up to the bankruptcies gave me serious concern about his ability to manage his financial affairs. Other aspects of this concern were that: this was his second bankruptcy; it was caused by rash property speculation (exchanging contracts on a development site without finance arranged – see ASIC Hearing 07.07.08 transcript 40); and, he had not obtained any employment since August 2008 (but complained of hardship caused by the banning order). Insofar as one can rely upon demeanour in such cases, Mr Caines’ actions did not show great concern about his livelihood - he had not undertaken any formal educational course and appeared to be convinced that the hearing was a mere formality to overcome a technical breach of ASIC’s requirements.
  4. One of ASIC’s background factors in its “Areas of Concern” notified to Mr Caines before the order was that he had previously been made bankrupt from 28 July 1994 to 29 July 1997 (see [4] TF.1). The fact that there were two periods of bankruptcy while Mr Caines was a financial adviser could bear on his ability to comply with financial services law, as well as his ability to manage the financial affairs of others given his difficulty in managing his own. Mr Caines’ view was that the first bankruptcy was caused by “a decision overnight” by a company to recall all of its agents’ loans. “We had a second mortgage and there was shortfall there ... nothing that I’d done irresponsibly ...” (see ASIC Hearing 07.07.08 transcript 50.6) which indicates some over-extending of investment.
  5. The second bankruptcy he says was the result of a creditor wanting “... to be bloody minded. I had no control over that.” (see ASIC Hearing 07.07.08 transcript 38.8) but the fact was that Mr Caines had signed a contract to purchase an incomplete home unit development without first arranging finance, he could not complete and he was sued for the deficit.
  6. His view of each matter was that he had no responsibility and each was the result of someone behaving unfairly. Mr Caines is an investment adviser with 30 years’ experience in commercial matters (see ASIC Hearing 07.07.08 transcript 51).
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
  1. I find that there has been a change of circumstances since the original banning order was made in that Mr Caines has been discharged from bankruptcy. Additionally, there has been some change in his knowledge of his obligations of disclosure of possible conflicts of interests as an investment adviser, but that change has not been of such degree or significance as to lead to an exercise of discretion in his favour so as to lead to a variation of the banning order.
  2. This matter has serious consequences for Mr Caines who has derived his livelihood from work as a financial adviser, and also for the public in whose interests the financial laws are made. My findings are made on the balance of probabilities but in the context of a Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; [1938] 60 CLR 336 degree of satisfaction given the situation. I am satisfied that there has not been a significant change of the relevant circumstances upon which ASIC relied in making the original banning order on Mr Caines such that my discretion should be exercised to vary or cancel the order.
  3. Accordingly, I affirm the decision under review.
I certify that the preceding 62 (sixty two) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Dean Letcher, QC, Senior Member.
.....................[SGD]...........................
Associate
Dated 14 May 2012

Date(s) of hearing28.11.2011; 08.12.2011
Advocate for the ApplicantJ Thomas
Counsel for the RespondentK Stern
Solicitors for the RespondentA Rees



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URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/AATA/2012/289.html

Thursday, 28 February 2013

ACN 079638501 V Pattison

- ACN 079 638 501 Pty Ltd v Pattison

 This is the corrupt trustee Paul Pattison that was protected by Veronique Ingram and senior management at ITSA

Up one level
- who owns the WIP.

Summary

An insolvency practice was operated through a company controlled by an insolvency practitioner. The Court made a finding that because of the particular arrangements between the company and the practitioner the work in progress was an asset belonging to the company. Accordingly, the court made a declaration that on the facts in this case work in progress is an asset of the Company. As the company had charged its assets in favour of a bank and the bank had appointed a Receiver the charge was enforceable by that Receiver.

Facts:

Mr Pattison operated his practice through the Company. The time spent by Mr Pattison was included in the Company’s invoice and no separate charge was made by Mr Pattison personally. Wages were payable to Mr Pattison as an employee. The Company had charged its assets in favour of the Bank of Western Australia (‘Bankwest’).
As part of the process of placing the Company into a members’ voluntary liquidation in April 2010 Mr Pattison’s declaration on solvency included the work in progress as an asset of the company and valued at $4.1million (as against $6.3 million recorded – the reduction based on his assessment of what could realistically be recovered).
Issue: Was the work in progress an asset of the Company, and hence subject to the Bankwest charge, or the property of Mr Pattison?

Decision:

The court considered the real question was the relationship between Mr Pattison and the Company and the effect that had on the ownership of the work in progress. Ferguson J accepted that:
There is no doubt that Mr Pattison had certain obligations arising from the appointment of him personally as liquidator, administrator or trustee in bankruptcy. However, that is not determinative of the ownership of the work in progress as between Mr Pattison and the Company.
The Court turned to consider whether Mr Pattison was an employee of the Company as the Receivers contended. Mr Pattison argued on the other hand the Company provided services to him and the arrangements for reimbursement could be terminated by him at any time without notice or penalty, presumably with the effect that any amounts due for work in progress reverted to him and were due to him as a personal liability. He referred to s165(1)(b) in support of this proposition, as this provision prohibits a trustee making an arrangement to give up a part of remuneration due to the trustee to any other person.
Citing Re Dare (1992) 38 FCR 356 for the proposition that being an employee is not necessarily incompatible with being registered as a trustee in bankruptcy, the court endorsed the proposition that what is of primary importance is whether the employee when acting as a trustee would enjoy ‘independence from external control’.
The Court noted that the fact that nothing prevented Mr Pattison from being an employee and at the same time accepting appointments, and nor did being a director of the Company prevent him from also being an employee of the Company.
In finding Mr Pattison was an employee Ferguson J took the following indicia into account:
i. The Company's books recorded Mr Pattison as an employee
ii. The work he performed went beyond which a Director would perform
iii. That work was recorded as work of the Company

iv. There was no separate work that was performed on the administrations that was recorded separately or for which a separate charge was made by him
v. The full amount of the fees charged was paid to the Company
vi. Mr Pattison did not seem to deduct any amount or receive payment of any part of the fees before the payment was made to the Company.
vii. Mr Pattison received from the Company amounts for that work that replicated wages rather than payment of the hourly fees charged for his time working on the administrations.
viii. The Company’s ownership of the work in progress was made clear in his Declaration in April 2010, which was consistent with his status as an employee, and the fiduciary duties not to profit from their position as director or employee at the expense of the Company, and to account for property received on behalf of the Company employer.
The court rejected the submission that the payments to the Company were reimbursement for services provided and instead concluded that Mr Pattison was ‘merely a conduit for payment for the money to the Company’.
The Court went on to hold that the work performed by Mr Pattison was an asset of the Company, the ‘time records’ being ‘akin to an inventory record for stock’. It only remained for the court to confirm that the charging provision was broad enough to capture the work in progress and that it was therefore enforceable by the Receivers appointed by Bankwest.
Note: Appeal application lodged in the Victorian Supreme Court decision by Mr Pattison - no hearing date has been advised yet.

Inspector Generals practice statement 8 Involuntary cancellation of a trustee

INSPECTOR-GENERAL PRACTICE STATEMENT 8
INVOLUNTARY CANCELLATION OF TRUSTEE REGISTRATION Released January 2009
Updated 1 February 2013
If you have any comments, suggestions or queries on a matter referred to in this Practice Statement, please contact us on 1300 364 785 or at regulation@itsa.gov.au or by mail addressed to:
Practice Manager – Regulation
Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia
PO Box 10443
Adelaide Street
BRISBANE QLD 4000
Inspector-General Practice Statement 8 – Involuntary cancellation of trustee registration 2 CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION 3
2. OVERVIEW OF BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEES’ DUTIES 3
3. DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS 3
Classification of non-compliance 4
4. DISCIPLINARY AND COMMITTEE PROCESS 5
Legislative basis 5
Committee process 6
The interview process and natural justice 6
5. THE DECISION 7
6. RIGHT OF REVIEW 8
Inspector-General Practice Statement 8 – Involuntary cancellation of trustee registration 3 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1. In the past, courts decided on whether to cancel a trustee’s registration. On 16 December 1996 this became an administrative decision made by a committee convened by the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy.
1.2. This document outlines the process involved when the Inspector-General considers taking steps that may lead to cancellation of the registration of a registered trustee under the
Bankruptcy Act 1966 ("the Act"). This document also outlines the independent committee processes and the basis of the Inspector-General’s decision making. 2. OVERVIEW OF BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEES’ DUTIES 2.1. Registered trustees are required to maintain the utmost professionalism, independence, impartiality, honesty and ethics in their dealings. They are considered officers of the court and, in exercising powers and discretions and making decisions, no lesser standard is to be expected of them than of a court or judge. They play a central role in the administration of estates and are under a general duty to exercise the powers in such a fashion that the objects of the Act, including those of equality between creditors and fairness to bankrupts and debtors, are served.
2.2. Registered trustees also have statutory duties set out in the Act. They have a fundamental duty when administering an estate to carry out certain investigations and undertake certain tasks and functions as set out in section 19 of the Act. Trustees are also required to maintain proper accounts and records, have proper money handling processes and assist the Inspector-General in her investigations when required.
2.3. Registered trustees are also required to comply with the legislative standards set out in Schedule 4A of the Bankruptcy Regulations 1996.
3. DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS 3.1. As described in the Schedule 4A performance standards for trustees, there is an expectation that trustees who, without reasonable explanation, regularly fail to comply with the Act and Regulations, who diverge from acceptable standards of practice or whose behaviour or conduct brings the integrity of the insolvency system into disrepute will be subject to disciplinary action.
3.2. Disciplinary action may be taken where a breach of the Act or a performance standard is identified. In deciding what action is appropriate, ITSA Regulation takes into account:
a. the nature of the breach
b. the seriousness of the effect of a failure to comply, including the impact on a particular estate or individual
c. a trustee's performance history and whether the trustee has previously failed to comply when able to.
Inspector-General Practice Statement 8 – Involuntary cancellation of trustee registration 4 3.3. There is a range of sanctions or actions which Bankruptcy Regulation can take when it considers breaches of duty or non-compliance have occurred. Involuntary cancellation of registration is generally a sanction of last resort. Sanctions that Bankruptcy Regulation may consider prior to initiating action to de-register a trustee include:
a. education – making trustees aware of problem areas and the correct practice or law individually and collectively
b. individual counselling – by far the most effective means to achieve timely remedial action
c. changing in the risk classification of a trustee. This will lead to a larger sample of files being selected for future annual inspections and a more detailed inspection being undertaken, particularly in areas of prior non-compliance
d. formal investigation and reporting under section 12 of the Act. Such reports may be supplied to creditors, police and other regulator or disciplinary bodies such as ICAA, CPA or Law Councils and Societies
e. audit of a trustees accounts under section 175 of the Act
f. imposition of penalties for realisations and interest charge breaches
g. issue of "show cause" letters requiring a trustee to explain both their actions and why they should continue to be registered
h. referral to other investigation units or law enforcement bodies.
Classification of non-compliance 3.3. ITSA Regulation utilises a classification system to describe areas of non-compliance and assist it to decide on the appropriate action to take subject to the seriousness and impact. Category A Fundamental breaches and lack of controls that are likely to bring into question the integrity of the system. This includes cases where there are repeat non-compliance occurrences of Category B type previously identified and reported on.
These matters will give rise to either legal action, referral to fraud investigators or section 155H action concerning deregistration.
Category B Serious and systemic issues that will have a material impact on the administration and require timely action.
In these cases the trustee will be counselled and timely remedial action is expected to be taken. Failure to take timely remedial action will give rise to reclassification to a Category A and appropriate action.
Category C One-off practice or procedural non-compliance is not systemic and doesn’t have a significant impact on the administration, dividends or creditors, debtors’ rights or system integrity but should be brought to the attention of the trustee.
Further identification of errors of this nature through complaints or later inspections would see the escalation of the error to a Category B and counselling of the trustee.
Inspector-General Practice Statement 8 – Involuntary cancellation of trustee registration 5 3.4. This provides a structured process that will see the escalation of a matter if it is not resolved by the trustee. Most matters are resolved quickly and amicably upon intervention by ITSA Regulation.
3.5. Hence breaches or non-compliance with the Act or a performance standard may give rise to a simple query by ITSA Regulation on the reasons why there has been a deviation and where repetitive breaches occur or, in the case of a serious breach, result in action to cancel a trustee’s registration.
4. DISCIPLINARY AND COMMITTEE PROCESS 4.1. Usually a trustee will be well informed of issues of concern raised by ITSA Regulation, as delegate for the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy, during investigations or inspections and will have been provided the opportunity to state their position. Legislative basis 4.2. Section 155H provides that the Inspector-General may ask a registered trustee to give the Inspector-General a written explanation why the trustee should continue to be registered, if the Inspector-General believes that: "(a) the trustee no longer has a qualification or ability that is prescribed by the regulations made for the purposes of paragraph 155A(2)(a); or
(aa) the trustee no longer has the ability (including knowledge) to perform satisfactorily the duties of a registered trustee; or
(b) the trustee has been convicted of an offence involving fraud or dishonesty since registration as a trustee; or
(c) the trustee is not insured against liabilities that the trustee may incur, or has incurred, working as a registered trustee; or
(d) the trustee is no longer practising as a registered trustee; or
(e) the trustee has contravened any conditions imposed by the committee on the trustee’s practice; or
(f) the trustee has failed to exercise powers of a registered trustee properly or has failed to carry out the duties of a registered trustee properly; or
(fa) if the trustee is or was the administrator of a debt agreement—the trustee has failed to properly carry out the duties of an administrator in relation to a debt agreement; or
(g) the trustee has failed to comply with a standard prescribed for the purposes of subsection (5)."
4.3. If ITSA Regulation, as delegate of the Inspector-General, then forms the belief that a ground set out in section 155H is established and other sanctions are either inappropriate or have had no positive effect, Regulation will formally write to the trustee outlining the breaches in detail, seeking the trustee’s formal response as to why their registration should not be cancelled. The trustee is given 28 days to respond in writing.
4.4. If the Inspector-General or delegate does not receive an explanation within a reasonable time, or is not satisfied by the explanation, the Inspector-General or delegate must convene a committee to consider whether the trustee should continue to be registered.
Inspector-General Practice Statement 8 – Involuntary cancellation of trustee registration 6 Committee process 4.5. The committee must consist of the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy or delegate, an officer of the Australian Public Service ("APS") and a registered trustee, registered for more than five years, nominated by the Insolvency Practitioners Association ("IPA"). To ensure impartiality no delegate involved in decisions to this point will act as delegate of the Inspector-General on the committee.
4.6. The committee is required to make inquiries that are reasonable for the purpose of making an informed decision or that the chairperson believes are appropriate in order for the committee to have sufficient information to make the decision.
4.7. A committee must observe natural justice. This is explained in more detail below.
4.8. A committee is not bound by any rules of evidence but may inform itself on any matter as it sees fit. This means that the committee will not hear submissions on whether information provided is admissible in a court of law or not. Similarly there is no right of "objection" to the questions being asked by the committee. Questions will be asked of the trustee and the trustee can choose either to answer or not. The committee may proceed with its consideration of the matter irrespective of any refusal to answer.
4.9. Whilst it will usually consider all the supporting documents that formed the basis of ITSA Regulation’s decisions and the trustee’s responses, the committee is not limited to just that information or the information that formed the basis of the prior decision to issue a show cause letter. The committee can consider any information and form its own view in the matter.
4.10. The committee will interview the trustee. Details of the interview process are provided below.
4.11. Once the committee has considered all the information it needs it will decide firstly whether there was a breach set out in section 155H, and if so whether that breach or breaches were serious enough to either impose conditions on the registration or to cancel the trustee’s registration.
4.12. It must provide reasons for its decision to both the trustee and the Inspector-General. The Inspector-General must accept the committee’s decision and give effect to the decision.
4.13. Pursuant to regulation 8.32, a committee must take all reasonable measures to protect from unauthorised use or disclosure information given to it in confidence in, or in connection with the performance of its functions or the exercise of its powers.
The interview process and natural justice 4.14. Once the Inspector-General or delegate has determined the makeup of the committee, the committee will convene to consider the matter. The date of convening will usually be the first time the committee meets and as timeframes commence from this date, the trustee will be advised. Inspector-General Practice Statement 8 – Involuntary cancellation of trustee registration 7 4.15. The interview date, time and place will be arranged to meet the needs of the committee and the trustee.
4.16. Should the trustee fail to attend the interview and fail to give a reasonable excuse for non-attendance within seven days, the committee may proceed with its consideration of the matter. If a reasonable excuse for failure to attend is provided within seven days, the committee must arrange another interview date, time and place.
4.17. The trustee may choose to have legal representation at any point in the process.
4.18. The interview is an inquisitorial process, not an adversarial one. The process is both to provide the trustee with an opportunity to further rebut or comment on the issues raised previously by the ITSA Regulation delegate and to allow the committee to seek clarification on issues and ask questions concerning the administrations and practices.
4.19. The trustee may make submissions both on the issue of the prior delegates decision concerning breaches set out in subsection 155H(1) of the Act and on appropriate sanctions that should be imposed by the committee, in the event that the committee also finds breaches occurred.
4.20. Time will be allowed for such submissions and the trustee may introduce any further information either in writing or orally and this includes any other parties who would like to put submissions on the trustee’s behalf. The trustee should advise the committee prior to the interview if there are any other people s/he wishes to call to put information to the committee at that time.
4.21. Usually prior to the interview, the trustee will be provided with all the information the committee has been provided with and may rely upon, to allow the trustee to prepare a response. However, as some information may not become available until the interview or afterwards this will not always be possible.
4.22. The committee will before making its decision provide advice on the information it will rely upon and provide any subsequent information to the trustee obtained during or after interview and allow a reasonable time for the trustee to consider and respond.
4.23. Should assertions be made as to the character of the trustee by any party and the assertions form part of the information on which the committee will rely, the trustee will have a right under natural justice principles to cross examine the person who made the assertion.
5. THE DECISION 5.1. The committee is required to keep minutes recording their meetings and decisions made and must make a decision within 60 days of first convening, which is usually the day of the interview. Inspector-General Practice Statement 8 – Involuntary cancellation of trustee registration 8 5.2. The committee has 14 days from the date of reaching a decision to provide a report of its decision to the trustee and the Inspector-General.
5.3. The committee has three decision options:
cancel the trustee’s registration allow the trustee to remain registered unconditionally allow the trustee to remain registered but with conditions imposed. 5.4. It is important to note that the decision on whether to remove a trustee’s registration lies with the committee and not the Inspector-General. The committee decision is also independent to ITSA Regulation’s investigations and decisions.
5.5. The courts have historically held trustees’ registrations in high regard and have been reluctant to de-register trustees unless the most serious breaches have occurred. Committees, whose decisions are reviewable in the AAT, will consider any legal precedents which may provide guidance, in arriving at their decision.
5.6. Committees cannot suspend a trustee’s registration. However, a conditional registration could be made where the trustee remains registered but may be restricted from practicing for a certain period or restricted in some other way.
5.7. The committee report, to be provided to the trustee and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy within 14 days of reaching its decision, will outline the basis of the decision, detail the issues considered and the information and law relied upon.
5.8. If the decision is to cancel registration, the trustee will be required to return their certificate of registration unless they have a reasonable excuse not to do so. The trustee will not be entitled to a refund of all or part of any registration fee that has been paid. The trustee would not be entitled to re-apply for registration for a period of 10 years.
5.9. The Inspector-General is required by law to record the cancellation of the trustee’s registration on the National Personal Insolvency Index, a publicly-accessible database. The Inspector-General is also required to report to Parliament on activities under the Bankruptcy Act. This means that, while the decision in detail is not made publically available, the name of the trustee whose registration has been cancelled will be made public as will the general nature of the breaches involved.
6. RIGHT OF REVIEW 6.1. If the trustee is dissatisfied with the committee’s decision, they may appeal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the AAT"). An application to the AAT for a review of the committee’s decision must be in writing, set out the reasons for the application and must be made within 28 days of the date the committee’s report is received by the trustee. Full information about applications to the AAT can be obtained from the local AAT Registry or from the internet at www.aat.gov.au.

Tuesday, 26 February 2013

public servants baulk at FOI changes

Posted: 25 Feb 2013 12:16 PM PST
Attitudes and culture within government agencies regarding openness and transparency as reflected in submissions to the Hawke Freedom of information review was an issue also picked up in Stephanie Peatling's article in Fairfax Media yesterday: Public servants baulk at FOI changes. 

"The public service is revolting against reforms" are the reporter's words not mine but I admit to the following contributions to Peatling's report, along the lines of my brief summary in a recent post.
 'The first word that comes to mind is blowback,'' lawyer and FOI expert Peter Timmins said. ''The general thrust of most of them is to bring into question the reforms of 2010.''.... Mr Timmins said many members of the public service still tried to keep information from being released for fear of the political fallout.
 ''There are still decisions that err on the side of excessive secrecy,'' Mr Timmins said. ''There's a perspective that all this [the reforms] has gone too far.''
The article attracted comments on-line including this from Eudaimonia of Kingston who really knows how to hurt a guy:
 I doubt if Mr Timmins and his ilk really know much about the FOI Act. I was involved with FOI as a practitioner for 19 years from its inception in Dec '82. For some strange reason, some applicants delude themselves that they will get more mileage out of their request by making it through a lawyer. It couldn't be farther from the truth. Primarily, lawyers, due to the sterile nature of their training. invariably have no concept of ''the spirit of the Act'', which is enshrined in s3 (I think). It was unique to FOI in 1982. Essentially, it says that if there's no good reason for refusing access, then the document should be released. Moreover, the average lawyer may have spent a few lectures and tutorials on FOI in the entire course of his/her training. Upon being hired by the applicant, they pull out their copy of the Act and have a read of it, probably for the first time in some cases. Often their copy of the Act is out-of-date. I once was contacted by a QC on behalf of his client. He was still using a superceded version in which ''personal information about'' had not been substituted for ''information relating to the personal affairs of'' (s41) - very different concepts in law. God only knows what his client was paying for a Silk's advice.